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Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior 
 Lee  Epstein ,  Andrew D.  Martin ,  Kevin M.  Quinn ,  and  Jeffrey A.  Segal 
 The role of ideology in the study of political behavior has a long and distin-
guished history. * Whether writing in the 1940s, the 2000s, or eras in between, 
political scientists have examined the assumption that the ideological com-
mitments of the masses and elites alike help explain the political choices they 
make—from their willingness to support particular public policies to the votes 
they cast. 1 As James L. Stimson (1991), the eminent student of public opinion, 
puts it, “Ideology won’t go away. It is too important” (p.61). 2 
 With even less controversy, we can say that political scientists—and increas-
ingly, legal academics—who study judging tend to share the idea that expla-
nations of judicial behavior that fail to incorporate ideology are incomplete at 
best. 
 This chapter begins with a brief description of the role ideology plays in 
political science accounts of judging. Parts II and III turn to the challenges 
scholars confront when empirically assessing judicial decision making and the 
methods political scientists have developed to meet these challenges. While 
much work remains, the fi eld has advanced markedly since its founding in 
the 1940s, 3 as evidenced by a plethora of interesting research results in recent 
years. Part IV provides an overview of some of the more prominent fi ndings. 
 I. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ACCOUNTS OF JUDGING 
 Ask 10 law professors to articulate a theory of judging and you are likely to 
receive 10 different responses. The same is true of political scientists. No one 
theory of judging, much less a unifying paradigm, dominates the fi eld. On 
the other hand, in virtually all political science accounts of judicial decisions, 
ideology plays an important, if not central, role. 4 
 In a nutshell, political scientists see judges as attempting to maximize their 
ideological preferences by bringing the law in line with their own political com-
mitments. 5 Judges accomplish this mission, according to some political science 
accounts, by voting on the basis of their sincerely held ideological  attitudes 
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vis-à-vis the facts of cases, and nothing more. 6 In other words, Justice Scalia 
“votes the way he does because he extremely is conservative; Justice Marshall 
voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal” (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, 
p. 86). On other political science accounts, justices seek to achieve their policy 
goals by acting  strategically— that is, by taking into account the preferences 
and likely actions of actors who are in position to thwart the achievement 
of their political objectives, including Congress, the president, and their own 
colleagues. 7 
 These two accounts may differ in their details, but they do not veer in their 
emphasis on politics as opposed to “law.” Neither posits judges as neutral, 
principled decision makers; instead, both subscribe to Stimson’s general view 
that ideology is a driving force in politics—including on the bench. 8 Seen in 
this way, they offer a fundamentally different take on judging from traditional 
“legalistic accounts,” which do not recognize a role for ideology. 
 This is not to say that legal methods—whether appeals to text, precedent, 
history, and so on—play no role in ideological accounts of judging; very few 
political scientists would go that far. It is, rather, to say that on most political 
accounts, legal factors come into play as  constraints on judges and not as moti-
vating forces. 
 To see the point, consider federal trial court judges. Political scientists would 
say that these judges are no different from all other judges: they would like to 
see the law refl ect their own ideological values. But, like all other judges, they 
face several constraints along the way. For example, if trial judges fail to take 
into account precedent established by their judicial superiors, they run the 
risk of reversal—in which case the higher court could supplant trial judges’ 
most favored rule with their least favored alternative (e.g., Randazzo, 2008; 
Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007). Note that the trial judges in this example do not 
attend to precedent for the sake of attending to precedent. Rather, they follow 
it in an effort to maximize their policy preferences, to avoid adoption of their 
least favored rule. In other words, the doctrine of  stare decisis —or, more point-
edly, the judicial hierarchy—acts as a constraint on the judges’ policy prefer-
ences and is not a goal in and of itself. 
 In addition to legal factors that may serve as limitations on judges’ pur-
suit of their ideological goals, literature in political science (and, increasingly, 
in law—e.g., Posner, 2008; Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, & Sawicki, 2006) con-
siders other forces that may constrain the ability of judges to vote sincerely, 
including the preferences and likely actions of elected actors (Eskridge, 1991a, 
1991b; Bergara, Richman, & Spiller, 2003), the judges’ colleagues, (Sunstein et 
al., 2006; Cross & Tiller, 1998), and the public (especially for judges who must 
be reelected to keep their job; Brace & Boyea, 2008; Huber & Gordon, 2004). 
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But, yet again, many political scientists argue that in the absence of these con-
straints the judges would do exactly what they want, which is to bring the law 
in line with their ideological values. 
 Of course, it is one thing to state the political science claim about the preva-
lence of ideology and quite another to test it. Two challenges stand out: charac-
terizing the ideology of judges, which is the topic of part II, and characterizing 
the ideology of their decisions, which is taken up in part III. 
 II. THE IDEOLOGY OF JUDGES 
 For most studies, characterizing the ideology of judges basically boils down to 
determining whether they are liberal, conservative, or something in between. 
Early on, scholars undertook this task by relying on a judge’s party affi liation 
or, more typically (for federal judges), the party of the appointing president. 
Judges appointed by Republican presidents, or who are Republicans them-
selves, are thought to be more conservative than Democratic appointees. 
 This party-based approach has several nice features. Primarily, it produces 
high intercoder agreement: if the coders had a list of the party affi liation of 
every president (or every judge) and knew which president appointed a par-
ticular judge, no judgment calls are required. 9 
 The high degree of reliability may explain why partisanship remains a 
common surrogate for ideology in some circles. 10 But many political scien-
tists have questioned whether party-based approaches are valid—that is, 
whether they accurately capture the concept of ideology. Along these lines, 
critics point to four troublesome assumptions underlying the approach. The 
fi rst assumption is that all Republican presidents (or judges) are conservatives 
and all Democratic presidents (or judges) are liberal. However, data tend to 
show otherwise. On one measure of economic liberalism, for example, Jimmy 
Carter was ideologically closer to Richard Nixon than to Lyndon Johnson. 11 Or 
as Giles and his colleagues put it, “presidents of the same political party vary 
in their ideological preferences. Eisenhower is not Reagan. Indeed, the empiri-
cal record demonstrates that the voting propensities of the appointees of some 
Democratic and Republican presidents do not differ signifi cantly” (Giles, Het-
tinger, & Peppers, 2001, p. 624; see Songer & Haire, 1992). 12 A second assump-
tion—that all presidents are motivated to appoint judges who refl ect their 
ideology—also fails to comport with various studies delineating other presi-
dential goals. To provide but one example, Ronald Reagan’s appointment of 
Sandra Day O’Connor was less about advancing ideological goals than about 
appealing to female voters. 13 A third crucial assumption is that a judge’s ideol-
ogy is stable. If it is not, the static measure of the judge’s or president’s party 
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affi liation would fail to capture any changes. As it turns out, though, this 
assumption does not typically hold. Several recent studies of Supreme Court 
justices reveal substantial ideological drift over time, as we explain in part II 
(Martin & Quinn, 2007; Epstein, Martin, Quinn, & Segal, 2007). Fourth, party-
based approaches assume that the president controls judicial nominations. For 
federal appellate and trial court judges, however, this assumption neglects an 
important institutional feature of the appointment process—called “senatorial 
courtesy”—which may constrain the president from nominating a candidate 
to the lower federal courts who mirrors his ideology (Giles et al., 2001). Under 
courtesy norms, when a senator is of the same party as the president and the 
vacancy is from the senator’s state, the senator can exert considerable infl u-
ence on the selection of judges. 
 In light of these concerns, political scientists have devised several alterna-
tive measures of judicial ideology. Some measures are exogenous, meaning 
they are not based on the votes judges cast or other choices they make. 14 Other 
measures are endogenous, meaning they are derived, at least in part, from 
those votes. Exogenous measures are useful for causal accounts; endogenous 
measures have the benefi t of greater precision. The choice between the two 
depends largely on the goals of the study. 
 When the goal is to explain the effect of ideology on the judges’ votes, 
scholars typically prefer exogenous measures because explaining votes with 
measures derived (even in part) from those very same votes involves a degree 
of circularity. For example, if we classify Scalia as conservative because he 
casts conservative votes, all we can say is that Scalia’s votes predict his votes. 
But in studies that take the effect of ideology as a given and wish to describe 
how it works (for example, whether liberals or conservatives are most likely 
to support First Amendment values; whether ideology changes over time), 
endogenous approaches may be preferable because they are more precise. Let 
us elaborate. 
 A. Exogenous Measures 
 For justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, political scientists have proposed a 
number of exogenous measures—measures that are based on information that 
is causally prior to any votes being cast—to capture ideology, but the most 
popular approach has been the Segal-Cover scores. Two political scientists, 
Segal and Cover (1989), derived these scores by content-analyzing newspa-
per editorials written between the time of the justices’ nomination to the U.S. 
Supreme Court and their confi rmation. Specifi cally, Segal and Cover trained 
students to code each paragraph in the editorial for political ideology as 
follows:
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 Paragraphs were coded as  liberal ,  moderate, conservative , or  not applicable . 
Liberal statements include (but are not limited to) those ascribing support 
for the rights of defendants in criminal cases, women and racial minori-
ties in equality cases, and the individual against the government in pri-
vacy and First Amendment cases. Conservative statements are those with 
an opposite direction. Moderate statements include those that explicitly 
ascribe moderation to the nominees or those that ascribe both liberal and 
conservative values. (p. 559) 
Segal and Cover then measured judicial ideology by subtracting the fraction of 
paragraphs coded conservative from the fraction of paragraphs coded liberal 
and dividing by the total number of paragraphs coded liberal, conservative, 
and moderate. The resulting scale of policy preferences ranges from 0 (unani-
mously conservative) to .5 (moderate) to 1 (unanimously liberal). Figure 20.1 
displays the results for Justices appointed since 1953. 
 It is easy to see why many scholars invoke these scores. First, with only a 
few exceptions (for instance, Warren seems more liberal than his score; Thomas 
seems more conservative than his), the overall results comport with scholarly 
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Figure 20.1 Ideology of Supreme Court Justices Appointed Since 1953, Based 
on Newspaper Editorials
Note: Data available in Epstein et al. (2007) and at http://www.sunysb.edu/
polsci/jsegal/qualtable.pdf.
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impressions of the justices. Brennan and Marshall, generally regarded as lib-
erals, receive scores of 1.00; Scalia and Rehnquist, generally regarded as con-
servatives, receive scores of 0 and .045, respectively. Second, the Segal-Cover 
scores do not appear to systematically over- or underestimate liberal votes. 
For most justices, the statistical fi t between their scores and their votes is quite 
good, with a .79 overall correlation between the two (see fi gure 20.6, later). 
 Despite the many desirable properties of the Segal-Cover scores, they are 
not without drawbacks. One is that they are better surrogates for ideology 
in cases involving civil rights and liberties than in litigation in areas such as 
federal taxation and federalism (Epstein & Mershon, 1997). This is hardly a 
surprise. When evaluating the ideology of would-be justices, newspaper edi-
tors—on whose judgment Segal and Cover (1989) rely—are far more likely to 
focus on, say, capital punishment than on changes to the tax code. Second, just 
as some analysts critique partisan measures for being static, we could level 
the same charge at the Segal-Cover scores: once computed they do not vary 
over the course of an individual justice’s career. Were only one or two justices 
to change over time, this would not be a particularly troublesome. But new 
research shows that virtually all the justices serving since 1937 grew more 
liberal or conservative during their tenure on the Court (Epstein et al., 2007). 
Figure 20.2 illustrates one of the more extreme examples: Harry Blackmun’s 
nearly complete fl ip, from one of the Court’s most conservative members to 
among its most consistent civil libertarians. Obviously an ideological score 
developed in 1970 would not be especially useful in predicting Blackmun’s 
votes two decades later, in 1990. To greater and lesser extents, we could say the 
same of many of the other justices. 
 A fi nal issue with the Segal-Cover scores is that the approach is limited to 
Supreme Court justices. Owing to a shortage of newspaper editorials, scholars 
have found it unfeasible to calculate ideological scores for judges serving in 
the lower federal courts or on state benches. 
 Perhaps analysts could eventually rely on blog discussions of lower court 
judges to perform much the same function as newspaper editorials. In the mean-
time, they have turned to other approaches. The state-of-the-art measure for the 
ideological preferences of U.S. Court of Appeals judges (and, for that matter, 
federal District Court judges), developed by Giles and his colleagues, exploits 
the norm of senatorial courtesy—the very norm that partisan measures ignore. 15 
If a judge is appointed from a state where the president and at least one home-
state senator are of the same party, the nominee is assigned the ideology of the 
home-state senator. If both senators are from the president’s party, the nominee 
is assigned the average ideology of the home-state. If neither home-state sena-
tor is of the president’s party, the nominee receives the ideological score of the 
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appointing president (Giles et al., 2001). 16 In short, when courtesy is in effect, the 
federal judge receives the ideology of the “nominating” senator; when courtesy 
is not in effect, the judge receives the score of the nominating president. 
 Seen in this way, the approach taken by Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers 
(2001) is far more effi cient than party-based approaches because it incor-
porates important information about how federal judges are appointed—
information that party-based approaches disregard. On the other hand, it suf-
fers from a problem that plagues many exogenous measures: it is static and so 
cannot account for ideological drift. It also assigns all judicial nominees from 
the same state and year the same ideology. 
 B. Endogenous Measures 
 To overcome the shortcomings of these exogenous measures, as well as 
to generate more precise estimates of ideology, social scientists have pro-
posed several endogenous approaches. Endogenous approaches depend on 
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Figure 20.2 Support for Civil Liberties Claims: The Career Voting Record of 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun
Note: This fi gure reports the percentage of votes cast each term in which Justice 
Blackmun supported defendants in criminal cases; women and minorities in civil 
rights cases; and individuals against the government in First Amendment, privacy, 
and due process cases. The superimposed line is a fi rst-degree loess smooth with 
span = 0.45.
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revealed behavior to measure ideology (Epstein & Mershon, 1997). Virtually 
all current work on the Supreme Court makes use of Andrew D. Martin and 
Kevin Quinn’s estimates of the justices’ ideologies. Derived from analyses 
of voting patterns on the Supreme Court each term—meaning that the jus-
tices’ ideologies can and do change over time—the Martin-Quinn scores are 
theoretically unbounded. For justices serving in the modern era, they range 
from a very liberal -6 (Justice Douglas) to a very conservative +4 (Justice 
Thomas). 17 
 Figure 20.3 underscores these last two points about the range and dynamic 
nature of the Martin-Quinn approach. The fi gure provides ideological esti-
mates for justices serving on three courts, in 1963, 1983, and 2003. Note, fi rst, 
the range from an exceptionally liberal Justice Douglas in the 1963 term to 
the exceptionally conservative Justice Thomas in the 2003 term. Now consider 
the dynamic character of the estimates, such that Justice Brennan’s ideological 
–6
Douglas Black Warren Goldberg Brennan White Clark Stewart Harlan
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Figure 20.3 Martin & Quinn’s Estimates of the Justices’ Ideologies for the 1963, 
1983, 2003 Terms
Note: We have ordered (on the horizontal axis) the justices serving during each 
term from most liberal to most conservative based on the Martin-Quinn estimates 
of their ideology, which are depicted on the vertical axis. The vertical axes run 
from most liberal (here, shown as -6) to most conservative (shown as +4).
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estimate of −.83 in 1963 was considerably more moderate than the 1983 esti-
mate of −2.82. Rehnquist was more moderate during his penultimate term as 
chief (in 2003) than during his associate days (1983 term). 
 Even from this brief description of the Martin-Quinn scores, their usefulness 
becomes more apparent. Because they are based on analyses of readily available 
data—vote patterns—they are susceptible to replication. They also square with 
our overall impressions of the ideology of the justices. In fi gure 20.3, notice, for 
example, that Justices Scalia and Thomas, generally considered the most reliably 
conservative members of the Rehnquist Court (and now the Roberts Court), 
anchor the right end and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, the left end. Finally, as 
we just noted, Martin-Quinn scores overcome a major weakness of most exog-
enous measures: they are dynamic, enabling reliable and valid measurements of 
the justices’ ideologies even if their ideologies drift with time. 
 On the other hand, the Martin-Quinn approach suffers from the same 
problems as other endogenous measures: because researchers derive their 
estimates from votes, deploying these scores to study the effect of ideology 
on votes would amount to using votes to predict votes. One response is that 
researchers should use them only for certain kinds of studies—typically stud-
ies that already assume ideology has an effect on voting. Endogenous scores, 
for example, have been used in research on ideological drift, which asks 
whether justices’ ideologies change with time. 
 Another response to this endogeneity problem is to remove the cases of 
interest from the data and then estimate Martin-Quinn scores. Suppose we 
wanted to study the effect of ideology on votes in First Amendment cases. By 
purging the First Amendment cases and recalculating the scores, we would 
avoid the trap of using votes to predict votes. 
 At one level, this technically resolves the circularity problem, though this 
aspect of the problem can be overstated. As Martin and Quinn (2005) write,
 [A]s a practical matter using the full data Martin-Quinn scores when mod-
eling votes in a single issue is perfectly appropriate. While circularity is a 
technical concern, the resultant measures from purging issues will change 
very little, and so it is not worth the effort to do so. When modeling votes 
in a single issue area, circularity is not a practical concern. (p. 3) 
 But that response does not resolve a related problem as to what causes the 
justices’ votes in the fi rst place. Let’s say we are interested in the role of ide-
ology in explaining the justices’ First Amendment votes. If we exclude First 
Amendment votes in the calculation of the Martin-Quinn scores, we have 
eliminated the circularity question. But it introduces the question as to what 
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caused the non-First Amendment votes in the fi rst place. Ideology is a possible 
cause, but all we can really know is that the same factors that infl uence the 
justices’ non-First Amendment votes infl uence their First Amendment votes. 
 Nevertheless, these scores are descriptively more accurate than any of the 
exogenous measures—that is, on a term-by-term basis, they provide a more 
illuminating picture of the justices’ ideological preferences than either the 
Segal-Cover scores or party-based measures. So if scholars need to know who 
the median justice is, or whether the Chief Justice overassigns opinions to 
justices ideologically close to him, then these scores substantially outperform 
exogenous measures. 
 III. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT OF CASES 
 Assessing political science accounts of judging requires more than estimating 
the judges’ ideologies. Also crucial to this enterprise is classifying the ideo-
logical content of judicial decisions. In other words, if we want to claim that a 
liberal judge will cast a liberal vote, not only do we need to know whether the 
judge is liberal or not but we also need to know what a liberal vote means. 
 Harold J. Spaeth, a political scientist and law professor, offers a potential 
solution. In the late 1980s, he developed the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial 
Database, which contains hundreds of pieces of information about each case, 
including whether the Court’s decision (and each justice’s vote) was liberal 
or conservative. For the most part, Spaeth’s defi nitions comport with conven-
tional usage. 18 “Liberal” decisions or votes are those in favor of defendants in 
criminal cases; of women and minorities in civil rights cases; of individuals 
against the government in First Amendment, privacy, and due process cases; 
of unions over individuals and individuals over businesses in labor cases; and 
the government over businesses in economic regulation. “Conservative” deci-
sions and votes are the reverse. 
 Spaeth’s approach meets a very important criterion in the social sci-
ences: reliability. That is, using Spaeth’s defi nitions, scholars can replicate his 
results. Nonetheless, some have taken issue with the defi nitions themselves, 
pointing out that while Spaeth’s classifi cations are clear, it is not clear that 
complex cases always fi t neatly into one category or the other. Take  Wisconsin 
v. Mitchell (1993), in which the Court upheld a state law that increased the 
sentence for crimes if the defendant “intentionally selects the person against 
whom the crime is committed” on the basis of race, religion, national origin, 
sexual orientation, or other similar criteria. If we view the law as penalizing 
racial or ethnic hatred, we would count it as defending civil rights (a “liberal” 
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decision). If, however, we see the law as penalizing a person because of what 
she believes or says, we would deem the ruling anti–rights (a “conservative” 
decision). 
 There are other potential problems. 19 But most behavioral studies of judg-
ing—whether at the federal or state level—have adopted Spaeth’s defi nitions. 
There are two major factors explaining the widespread use of this measure. First, 
Spaeth’s results square with general expectations of what is liberal and conser-
vative. Consider fi gure 20.4, in which we show the fraction of conservative deci-
sions rendered by the Supreme Court since 1953. Note the marked change in 
the 1969 term, coinciding with Nixon’s replacement of Earl Warren with Warren 
Burger. Within one year, the proportion of right-of-center decisions increased by 
over 50% , from .30 in 1968 to .47 in 1969. Moreover, in comparing the overall 
means of conservatism during the two Court eras—the Warren Court (.34) and 
Burger Court (.55)—the difference, not surprisingly, is statistically signifi cant. 20 
This pattern comports with modern-day writings on the Court, as does the rela-
tively stable degree of conservatism after the 1969 term. 
 Second, at least some of the problems scholars have suggested with Spaeth’s 
approach are, in actuality, fairly trivial. Returning to  Wisconsin v. Mitchell , the 
critique was that the case has two dimensions—race and speech—and so 
deciding whether it is a liberal or conservative decision depends on whether 
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one codes it as a race case or a speech case. But as it turns out, cases like 
 Wisconsin are something of an oddity. A rather large body of literature tells us 
that a single left-right dimension underlies virtually all Supreme Court cases 
in virtually all areas of the law. 21 
 For many studies of judging, Spaeth’s approach is the end of the matter. 
Based on his defi nitions of ideology (or adaptations of them), scholars classify 
decisions as “liberal” or “conservative.” This approach works well for stud-
ies of individual judges in which we want to know, for example, whether the 
judge voted in accord with his ideology. However, some critics say improve-
ments are needed in the study of court decisions. 
 Again, consider the Supreme Court and suppose that the justices are 
aligned ideologically as indicated in fi gure 20.5. Further suppose that they 
issue a decision favoring the state in a death penalty case, with Justice 
Kennedy writing for a fi ve-person majority (Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas). 
 Under Spaeth’s approach, we would designate the decision as “conserva-
tive” because it favored the state rather than the defendant. But that approach 
fails to make use of several pieces of important information—the content of 
the majority opinion and the identity of the members of the majority, both of 
which may be useful in developing a more precise understanding of the deci-
sion’s ideological content. Rather than simply code the decision as “liberal” or 
“conservative,” we might use computer-based codings to categorize the opin-
ion along a more precisely measured scale.  Roe v. Wade and  Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey are both liberal decisions under Spaeth’s codings, but  Roe is certainly 
more liberal than  Casey . Computer programs such as Wordscore can assist in 
measuring these differences (McGuire & Vanberg, 2005). Alternatively, we 
could assign the opinion the Martin-Quinn score of the median member of the 
majority (Jacobi, 2009). Another possibility would be to focus on the ideology 
of the majority opinion writer. 
 Deciding precisely how to proceed depends on one’s theory of decision 
making. As computer-based systems improve, scholars will increasingly rely 
on them. For now, those who believe in a strong version of the median voter 
theorem might be inclined to classify the ideology of the decision on the basis 
of the median member of the majority. Following theories of agenda setting, 
Breyer Souter
GinsburgStevens Kennedy
Alito
Roberts Scalia Thomas
Figure 20.5 Martin-Quinn Estimates for Supreme Court Justices, 2007 Term
Note: We have arrayed the justices from most liberal (Stevens) to most conservative 
(Thomas) based on their 2007 Martin-Quinn scores.
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on the other hand, using the opinion writer’s ideological score might make 
more sense. Either way, some argue that these approaches have the potential 
to provide a fi ner-grained understanding of Court decisions, which analysts 
could apply to any collegial decision-making body. 
 IV. A (VERY) SMALL SAMPLE OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 A full review of the research fi ndings on judging and ideology would take 
more pages than are in this entire volume. What we can do instead is provide 
the fl avor of some of the more prominent fi ndings. 
 One important set of data focuses specifi cally on the simple relationship 
between votes and judging. Figure 20.6 tells the basic story at least for the 
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Figure 20.6 Relationship between Newspaper Editors’ Characterizations of the 
Justices’ Ideology Prior to Their Appointment and the Justices’ Votes, 1953–
2007 Terms
Note: Th e superimposed line represents a regression-based prediction of the justices’ votes 
based on their ideology, as measured by the Segal-Cover scores. Data on the votes of the 
justices come from the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database using all orally argued cases. 
Th e closer a justice is to the line, the stronger the association between the justice’s ideology 
and the justice’s votes. Th e justices above the line voted more liberally than we would pre-
dict based on their ideology; the justices below it voted more conservatively. For justices on 
the line, their ideology perfectly (or nearly so) predicts their votes. Th e correlation between 
the justices’ ideologies and their votes is .79.
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Supreme Court: regardless of whether we use the Segal-Cover or Martin-
Quinn scores to measure of ideology, a strong relationship exists between 
ideology and votes. The correlation of .79 refl ected in fi gure 20.6 is not at all 
atypical. 
 Turning to other courts substantially changes the picture. A now extensive 
body of literature on the U.S. Courts of Appeals reveals that the ideological 
preferences of the judges, however measured, provide only a partial expla-
nation of their decisions and then only in some areas of the law. A landmark 
study conducted by Sheldon Goldman in 1966 indicated that federal circuit 
court judges affi liated with the Democratic Party were, relative to Republican 
judges, far more likely to vote for unions in labor-management disputes and 
against corporations charged with antitrust violations. But Goldman found 
no statistically signifi cant differences between Democratic and Republican 
judges in the areas of criminal law and civil liberties, nor in challenges to gov-
ernment regulations brought by businesses. For example, judges appointed by 
Lyndon Johnson were no more likely to rule in favor of criminal defendants 
than judges appointed by Dwight Eisenhower. 
 More recent work by Cass Sunstein and his colleagues (2006) confi rms 
Goldman’s (mixed) fi ndings. To be sure, their examination of more than 19,000 
votes cast by Court of Appeals judges unearthed strong evidence of parti-
san voting in many areas of the law. In affi rmative action suits, for example, 
judges appointed by Republican presidents rarely voted to uphold the plan at 
issue, doing so in less than 50% of disputes. By contrast, Democratic appoin-
tees supported the plan in three out of every four cases. Yet in 5 of the 24 
areas of the law analyzed, the party of the appointing president was not an 
especially good predictor of the judge’s vote. In criminal cases, Democratic 
appointees were no more or less favorable toward defendants than Repub-
lican appointees. Likewise, for all but abortion and capital punishment, the 
judge’s vote was affected not only by his ideology but also by the ideology 
of the colleagues with whom he sat. All-Democratic panels vote to uphold 
affi rmative action plans in 81% of the cases, but when a Democratic appointee 
sits with two Republicans he votes to support the plan only 60% of the time. 
Likewise, all-Republican panels vote to strike plans in 66% of the cases, but a 
Republican sitting with two Democrats opposes them in only 30% of the cases. 
According to Sunstein and his collaborators (2006), both are clear examples of 
“ideological dampening.” 
 Finally, Segal’s research looks at the relationship between ideology 
and voting in the Court of Appeals, using the ideology scores set by Giles, 
Hettinger, & Peppers (2001), rather than the judges’ political party. As shown 
in fi gure 20.7, while the relationship between the judges’ ideologies and their 
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votes is reasonably strong (.39), ideology is a far worse predictor for lower 
court judges than it is for Supreme Court justices. As Segal (2008) concluded, 
“obviously much more is at work on the Court of Appeals than just ideology” 
(p. 28). Perhaps this other work might include “easy” cases where there is little 
room for ideological voting (those in which the law is clear (Howard, 1981), 
or in which issues lack ideological valence (Sunstein et al., 2006) or are con-
strained by the judge’s circuit or by the Supreme Court (Kim, 2009). 
 Still, it is possible that Segal’s fi ndings underestimate the impact of 
ideology. One problem could trace to measurement error in the Giles, 
Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) data, which would have the effect of dampening 
the observed relationship (e.g., King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). For example, 
while the Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) scores improve upon party-
based scores by taking advantage of senatorial courtesy, the actual application 
of courtesy varies from state to state and from appointment to appointment. 
For example, Democratic Senator Patrick Moynihan and Republican Senator 
Alfonse D’Amato agreed to split judicial nominations between them, with the 
senator of the president’s party receiving three-quarters of the picks (Johnson, 
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Figure 20.7 The Relationship between the Ideology of U.S. Court of Appeals 
Judges and their Votes
Note: Each dot represents a judge. The closer a judge is to the regression line, the 
better her ideology (as measured by the Giles et al. scores) corresponds to her 
votes. The correlation between ideology and votes is .39.
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1993). During Republican administrations, judges received D’Amato’s ideol-
ogy score even if Moynihan named them. During Democratic administrations, 
judges received Moynihan’s ideology score, even if they came from D’Amato’s 
list. Or consider the moderate ideology score attributed to conservative Court 
of Appeals Judge Richard Posner. Posner received the ideology score of mod-
erate Republican Senator Charles Percy. However, the Reagan White House 
imposed Posner’s nomination on Senator Percy over Percy’s opposition, so 
applying Percy’s moderate score to Posner is likely inaccurate (Anderson, 
1981). In short, while the revealed correlation of .39 indicates a reasonably 
strong link between ideology and behavior, ideology scores with less mea-
surement error would undoubtedly fi nd an even stronger relationship. 
 Even accounting for measurement error, though, the fi ndings are likely to 
remain relatively mixed for courts below the Supreme Court. This should not 
be altogether surprising. On one hand, we would not expect ideology or par-
tisanship to play absolutely  no role in judging on the appellate bench. If this 
were the case, no one would care much whether a Democrat or Republican 
won the presidency—at least not with regard to judicial selection. Their judi-
cial nominees would be essentially fungible, which the literature tells us is 
not the case. On the other hand, the lack of ideological voting in some areas is 
not diffi cult to explain: lower court judges face greater constraints in attempt-
ing to etch their ideology into law. Part 1 mentioned the threat of reversal by 
judicial superiors, but many other constraints exist, including the desire for 
promotion to a higher judicial offi ce. For ambitious appellate court judges, it 
may not be in their best interest to ignore organizational norms such as  stare 
decisis and decide purely on the basis of their ideology. 
 Studies like those depicted in fi gures 20.1 and 20.7 seek to identify a direct 
link between the judges’ ideologies and their votes. Extant research also has 
considered ideological patterns in other choices judges make, such as the deci-
sion to overrule a precedent. Perhaps not surprisingly, scholars have shown 
that conservative justices are more likely to vote to overrule precedents that 
liberals favor, such as  Roe v. Wade , and liberal justices to overrule conservative 
precedents, such as  Bowers v. Hardwick (Hansford & Spriggs, 2006; Brenner 
& Spaeth, 1995). The justices’ votes to overturn federal, state, and local laws 
seem equally ideological. Segal and Spaeth (2002) unearthed a consistent 
pattern in their examination of opinions in which at least one justice stated his 
desire to strike an act of government. Liberals vote to strike laws that liberal 
litigants (defendants in criminal cases, women and minorities in civil rights 
cases, etc.) want struck, while conservatives vote to strike laws that conser-
vative litigants (the government in criminal cases, those opposed to women 
and minorities in civil rights cases, etc.) want struck. 22 Lindquist and her 
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co-authors show a similar pattern for state and federal laws as well for the 
actions of administrative agencies (Lindquist, Smith, & Cross, 2007). All else 
being equal, the probability of Justice Scalia’s voting to strike a liberal agency 
policy directive is about .39; if the agency directive is conservative, the odds 
fall to .24. The fi gures for the liberal Justice Stevens are even starker: he will 
almost always uphold a liberal policy but more often than not strike a conser-
vative one (Lindquist et al., 2007). Even justices who profess a commitment to 
judicial “restraint” are not immune. Long ago, Spaeth famously shattered the 
myth that Felix Frankfurter—a justice whose name was “synonymous with 
the concept of judicial restraint”—adhered to that philosophy (Spaeth, 1964). 
By systematically examining his votes in cases involving labor and business 
regulation, Spaeth showed that Frankfurter’s purported “judicial restraint” 
was “thoroughly subordinated to [his] attitudes.” He was “a staunch eco-
nomic conservative” who was willing to strike down laws that impinged on 
his policy preferences (Segal & Spaeth, 2002, pp. 409–17). For example, during 
the fi rst seven terms of the Warren Court, Frankfurter voted to strike down 
only 9% of state regulations of labor, a position consistent with his professed 
judicial restraint. But he was willing to strike down 69% of state regulations of 
business (Spaeth, 1979, pp. 78–79). 
 These analyses may reach similar conclusions, but to some scholars, they 
suffer from a nontrivial problem: they tend to treat judges as operating within 
an ideological vacuum of sorts, making decisions without considering the 
preferences and likely actions of their colleagues. Recognizing that that may 
be unrealistic for collegial courts, social scientists have turned their attention 
to how judges serving on the same panel or court may affect one another.  
 One strand of this research focuses less on the ideology of the individual 
judges and more on how their ideology works to affect their colleagues. Recall 
that for most areas of the law they examined, Sunstein and colleagues (2006) 
found some evidence of ideological dampening, which occurs when a judge 
sits with two judges who do not share his partisan affi liation. They also found 
evidence of  ideological amplifi cation , such that judges sitting on homogeneous 
Democratic or Republican panels tend to be extremely ideological. Sunstein 
and colleagues (2006) point out that litigants defending affi rmative action 
programs have a one-in-three chance of prevailing when the panel is full of 
Republican appointees. The odds increase to four in fi ve when three Demo-
crats sit on the panel. Finding that similar panel effects pervade many other 
areas of the law, they conclude that the “political party of the presidents who 
appointed the other two judges on the panel is at least as good a predictor of 
how individual judges will vote” as the party affi liation of that individual 
judge’s appointing president (p.10). 
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 Why ideological panel effects seem to exist is a contested matter. One expla-
nation for ideological amplifi cation, proposed by Cross and Tiller (1998), is 
that homogeneous panels lack a “whistleblower”—a judge whose preferences 
differ from the majority’s and who will expose the majority’s extremeness to 
the rest of the circuit or to Supreme Court. Mixed panels, in contrast, will reach 
more moderate decisions because, by defi nition, a potential whistleblower is 
always present. Another explanation is far less nefarious. The idea is that any 
ideological effect on panels is a result of judges seeking to accommodate their 
colleagues and not of strategic behavior. 
 Whatever the explanation, it is clear that panel effects are not limited to 
panels; they seem to operate to varying degrees on all collegial courts. When 
Supreme Court justices vote to grant or deny certiorari, they calculate the like-
lihood that they will prevail at the next stage, in the decision on the merits. 
Making that calculation requires the justices to take into account the prefer-
ences and likely actions of their colleagues, and there is some evidence that 
they do just that. Even after taking into account the many factors that may 
affect the justices’ case selection decisions, such as the existence of a circuit 
split, Caldeira and his colleagues (1999) fi nd that the justices often cast votes 
that amount to “defensive denials.” That is, they vote to deny cert in cases 
they would otherwise like to reverse when they believe the case will not pre-
vail on the merits. They also fi nd evidence of “aggressive grants,” when the 
Court votes to hear a case on which they agree with the lower court ruling and 
believe a majority will affi rm. 
 Finally, there are many areas of inquiry concerned with understanding the 
forces that may tame ideological decision making. At the onset we mentioned 
 stare decisis . There are also studies that examine whether judges who must stand 
for reelection attend to their constituents’ preferences when they make their 
decisions. Substantial evidence now suggests that they do. Hewing perhaps to 
the Japanese axiom that the nail that sticks out is mostly likely to be hammered 
down, popularly elected judges are more likely to suppress dissent. They do 
not want to be “singled out for possible electoral sanction” (Hall, 1987, p. 1117), 
especially if their views are inconsistent with their constituents. 
 Relatedly, and perhaps more importantly, research indicates that even 
after controlling for their own ideological predilections, elected judges tend 
to reach decisions that refl ect popular sentiment. In one recent analysis, the 
authors report that all else being equal, state supreme court justices are 13% 
less likely to reverse death sentences when their constituents are strongly sup-
portive of the capital punishment (Brace & Boyea, 2008). Likewise, a study of 
all murders recorded by the Chicago police reveals that convicted defendants 
were signifi cantly more likely to be sentenced to death in a judge’s reelection 
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year (Brooks & Raphael, 2002). A scrupulous analysis of 22,000 trial court sen-
tences in assault, rape, and robbery convictions has found that sentences grow 
signifi cantly longer as a judge’s reelection comes nearer. The authors attribute 
1,800 to 2,700 additional years in prison time to elections (Huber & Gordon, 
2004). On the civil side, a study of 7,000 cases across 48 states demonstrates 
that elected judges are more likely to redistribute wealth from out-of-state 
businesses to in-state plaintiffs. The expected total award is about $240,000 
higher (Helland & Tabarrock, 1999). 
 What we have presented is just a taste of the empirical literature on ideol-
ogy. The project is now so large, encompassing scholars in no fewer than three 
disciplines, that it is impossible to review it all here. That is not to say that all 
the important work is done, nor is it to say that the methods and the fi ndings 
we have reported are wholly uncontroversial. Many areas remain unplowed. 
Methodological challenges remain. And empirical scholars have yet to deal 
with some of the normative critiques hurled at studies that emphasize ideol-
ogy. Yet the last several decades have seen marked advances in the study of 
ideology and judicial behavior, and no doubt more will follow even before this 
book appears in print. 
 NOTES 
  *    We are grateful to the National Science Foundation and Northwestern 
University School of Law for research support. 
 1.  Political scientists do, however, disagree over the defi nition of  ideology . For 
a range of possibilities, see Gerring (1997), though we think Bawn’s (1999) 
approach captures contemporary thinking: “Ideology is enduring system of 
beliefs, prescribing what action to take in a variety of political circumstances” 
(p. 305). In this chapter, our usage of  ideology relates to one’s position along the 
political spectrum. 
 2.  Converse (1964) argues, however, that American voters typically lack the atti-
tudinal constraint necessary for ideological behavior. 
  3.  Most political scientists credit C. Herman Pritchett with establishing the fi eld 
of judicial behavior in the 1940s (e.g., Pritchett, 1941, 1948). 
 4. For more on this point, see Epstein, Knight, and Martin (2003). 
 5.  Here and throughout, we emphasize voting on the merits of cases. In part IV, 
we briefl y describe research that asks whether ideological considerations infi l-
trate other choices that judges make. 
 6.  For the leading contemporary statement of this account, called “the attitudinal 
model,” see Segal and Spaeth (2002). 7. For a description of strategic accounts, 
see Epstein and Knight (1998). 8. We should offer a caveat to this claim. While it 
is true that under the attitudinal account judges pursue one and only one goal 
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(policy), on the strategic account it is up to the researcher to specify a priori 
the judges’ goals; the researcher may select any motivation(s) she believes the 
particular judges hold. Nonetheless, virtually every existing strategic account 
of judicial decisions posits that judges pursue policy—that is, their goal is to 
see public policy, the ultimate state of the law, refl ect their preferences. One 
(important) exception is Ferejohn and Weingast (1992), which posits that 
judges may have jurisprudential goals. 
 9.  Another advantage of the party-based approach is that it is exogenous of (that 
is, not caused by) judicial decisions, a point to which we return momentarily. 
 10.  Law professors seem more inclined to continue to rely on this approach than 
political scientists (see, e.g., Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, & Sawicki, 2006; Cross 
& Tiller, 1998; Heise & Sisk, 2005). 
 11.  Carter’s score is 60.3, Nixon’s is 47.7, and Johnson’s is 78.2 (Segal, Timpone, & 
Howard, 2000). 
 12.  To provide but one example, Haire, Humphries, and Songer (2001) report 
that: “In contrast to Reagan-Bush appointees, the Clinton appointees offered 
substantially more support to the liberal position in civil rights claims. When 
voting on criminal and economic issues, [however], Clinton judges gener-
ally adopted positions that were strikingly similar to those taken by judges 
appointed by moderate Republican [Presidents]” (p. 278). 
 13.  See Goldman (1997) arguing, on the basis of detailed archival work, that presi-
dents seek to advance one or some combination of three agendas—personal, 
partisan, or policy—when they make judicial nominations. “Personal agenda” 
refers to using the nominating power to please a friend or associate; “partisan 
agenda” means using nominations as vehicles for shoring up electoral sup-
port for their party or for themselves within their party; and “policy agenda” 
is about using nominations to enhance the substantive policy objectives of an 
administration. 
 14. Party-based approaches are, of course, exogenous. 
 15.  The norm of senatorial courtesy grants home-state senators of the president’s 
party near veto-like authority over lower court appointments from their state. 
If they declare that a nominee is repugnant to them, other senators will sup-
port that decision, knowing that they will receive the same courtesy about 
nominees from their state. 
 16.  For the senators’ and presidents’ ideology, Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) 
rely on Keith Poole’s Nominate Common Space scores, which are the result of 
a scaling algorithm that takes a set of issue scales (in this case, a set of measures 
for representatives, senators, and presidents) fi t term by term. Using legisla-
tors that have served in both chambers, presidents that have served in the 
legislature, and stated presidential vote intentions, the algorithm provides an 
ideal point for all representatives, senators, and presidents. 
 17.  The scores are available at:  http://mqscores.wustl.edu . For more details about 
their creation, see Martin and Quinn (2002). 
20Hanson-chapter20.indd   724 8/12/2011   10:34:20 PM
Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior 725
 18.  The database is at  http://supremecourtdatabase.org ; the documentation is at: 
 http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php . 
 19.  An additional diffi culty is that ideological labels may be time-dependent, 
bound to a particular historical era. For example,  Muller v. Oregon (1908) 
upheld a state law that set a maximum number of hours women (but not men) 
could work. How would 21st-century Americans classify this decision? Many 
would probably regard it as conservative because it seems to patronize and 
protect women. In the early 1900s, however, many considered  Muller a liberal 
ruling because it allowed the government to regulate business. 
 20. Using a  t -test,  p < 05. 
 21.  Nearly all systematic quantitative work on the U.S. Supreme Court suggests 
that the issue space can be characterized reasonably well by a single dimen-
sion. For instance, Grofman and Brazill (2002) note that the single-dimension 
solution explains much of the justices’ voting behaviors. The same, we might 
add, holds for Congress. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Poole (2007) both 
report that voting in Congress is almost exclusively one-dimensional, such that 
“a single dimension accounts for about 92 percent of roll call voting” (Poole & 
Rosenthal, 1997, p. 437). 
 22.  This would not have come as a surprise to Justice Thurgood Marshall. In 
response to the Court’s decision in  Payne v. Tennessee (1991), which overruled 
 Booth v. Maryland (1987), and  South Carolina v. Gathers (1989), Marshall quipped: 
“It takes little real detective work to discern just what has changed since this 
Court decided Booth and Gathers: this Court’s own personnel.” 
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